Hard-core cartels are considered to be the most egregious competition law offence. To escape detection and prosecution, their operation is secretive making their existence difficult to prove. In advanced competition law regimes, leniency programmes have proven to be the most effective tool for detecting cartels and obtaining evidence to prove their existence and effects. These programmes involve a commitment to a reduction of penalties designed to increase incentives of cartelists to self-report to the competition law enforcer.

Leniency programmes in different countries may mutually reinforce these incentives on members of international cartels. From this global perspective, it appears desirable that many countries adopt leniency programmes. However, to date, only a handful of developing countries have leniency programmes.

It appears that leniency programmes are effective only if cartelists perceive that detection, conviction and punishment are likely. Thus, a strong political commitment to fight cartels, which translates into effective enforcement action, is necessary for leniency programmes to be successful. In this context, this session is dedicated to assessing the effectiveness of leniency programmes as a tool for fighting hardcore cartels in developing countries.

The following questions are suggested for discussions at the conference:

• Is a leniency programme an integral part of an effective anti-cartel policy?
• Do characteristics of developing countries, the size of an economy and criminal sanctions for competition law violations affect leniency programme design?
• Can advanced competition law regimes engage in actions or policies to reduce the harm of cartels in other countries?
• Is there a role for international organizations such as UNCTAD to support developing countries in fighting cartels?